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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cambodian Suggestions

1. This memorandum outlines some possible action courses which might ameliorate the Cambodian problem. Specifically, it includes two alternative negotiating approaches and a set of remedial actions to improve the GKR's position and image. Either of the former could be pursued in tandem with the remedial actions, but the two negotiating approaches themselves have contrary aspects.

2. Some of these suggestions may be (or may already have been) overtaken by other developments or events now in train.

I. ASSUMPTIONS

1. This memorandum's action suggestions are premised on the assumption that the U.S. currently has three specific objectives in Cambodia:

a. To get meaningful negotiations started which shortly produce an end to the fighting (i. e., a cease-fire) and some form of compromise political settlement.

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b. Allow Fernandez to establish a clear and rigid chain of command within the army, and to discipline any officer who tries to bypass this chain of command.

c. Allow FANK (i. e., Fernandez) to establish its own table of organization.

d. Carry out an extensive shake-up of military staff and command officers at least down to the regional level, with the specific object of eliminating the more corrupt officers. (This would help alleviate the pay problem -- see next item.)

e. Do whatever is necessary to ensure that troops -- particularly troops on the line -- are paid on time. This does not require more money. It simply requires a reasonably honest distribution of funds which are already provided to the FANK. (We should investigate the possibility of U.S. personnel actually carrying the funds to the major combat units and personally distributing them to the troops. This approach has been effective in Laos.) The lack of pay is one of the principal reasons for poor FANK morale and poor FANK performance. Past experience indicates that if the troops are paid, they will fight. Thus, this step is the one most likely to show the greatest results in the shortest time.

f. Make an all-out attempt to show demonstrable progress toward meeting the needs of military dependents (better housing, allowances, other benefits). This is vital to improved morale -- the Khmer Krom units have been particularly affected by lack of support in this area.

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